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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Unconscious transference occurs when a witness misidentifies a familiar but innocent 
person from a lineup. In Ross, Atkinson, Rosenberg, Pica, and Pozullo (2014), the use of a 
sequential lineup procedure, in which faces are presented one at a time, drastically reduced the 
unconscious transference error, but at the cost of also reducing the rate of correct identifications.  
However, in that study, the participants were not told how many faces they would view in the 
sequential lineup.   In the present study, participants viewed a video of a staged crime that did or 
did not contain a bystander who looked similar to the thief, then subsequently viewed a lineup 
with either the thief or the bystander in it.  Knowing the correct number of faces to be seen 
reinstated the unconscious transference effect with no corresponding increase in the rate of 
correct identifications.  Other findings and policy implications are discussed.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Eyewitness evidence is often used in a court of law and is one of the strongest pieces of 
evidence on which a jury can rely (Laub & Bornstein, 2008).  However, over the past several 
years, the Innocence Project has found and exonerated over 300 people that were wrongfully 
convicted; over 75% of those convictions were based on faulty eyewitness identification 
(Innocence Project, 2012).  One of the possible reasons for wrongful convictions is that the 
eyewitness misidentifies a familiar but innocent bystander instead of the actual culprit, a 
phenomenon known as Unconscious Transference (Ross, Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 1994). 
 
Unconscious Transference 
 The term Unconscious Transference (UT) was first used in 1955 (Williams, 1955) and 
has been more recently defined as, “the transfer of one person’s identity to that of another person 
from a different setting, time, or context” (Read, Tollestrup, Mannersley, McFadzen, & 
Christensen, 1990, p. 3).  One real world example of the UT effect occurred when a man 
working in the ticket booth at a railroad station was robbed (Loftus, 1976).  That man later 
identified a sailor from a police lineup.  Luckily for the sailor, he had a solid alibi and was soon 
dismissed as a suspect.  It was later discovered that the sailor had bought tickets from the agent 
on several instances prior to the robbery and thus was familiar to the ticket agent.  It appeared 
that the ticket agent remembered the sailor, but forgot the context for his memory and 
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consequently misidentified him as the thief who robbed him.  This is a prime example of how 
UT can occur in real life situations and have dire consequences.  If not for the sailor’s solid alibi, 
he may have been tried and convicted of a crime that he did not commit. 
UT has been studied extensively but those studies have produced mixed results.  Some 
studies have found support for the UT effect (Buckhout, 1974; Loftus, 1976; Nelson et al. 2011; 
Ross, Benton, McDonnell, Metzger, & Silver, 2007; Ross et al. 1994; Ross et al. 2006).  For 
example, Ross et al. (1994) showed participants a video composed of scenes about a typical day 
in the life of a preschool teacher.  During the video, participants view a teacher reading to the 
children.  In the transference condition, the teacher is male and appears similar to the thief that 
they will see later in the video.  Conversely, in the control condition, the teacher is female.  At 
the end of the video in both conditions, a teacher has money stolen from her wallet while she is 
getting something from a vending machine.   
Ross et al. (1994) found that 75% of the participants in the transference condition and 
64% in the control condition correctly identified the thief from a thief present bystander absent 
lineup.  Thus, when participants actually saw the thief in the lineup, they correctly identified him 
approximately 70% of the time.  However, when the participants viewed a thief absent bystander 
present lineup, those in the transference condition incorrectly identified the bystander as the thief 
61% of the time, compared with 22% in the control condition. This showed that when the 
familiar, but innocent bystander was viewed in the lineup, and the participants had viewed the 
control video (in which the bystander is not present), the bystander was only identified at chance 
levels (1 in 5).  However, when the participants had viewed the transference video, they 
incorrectly identified the bystander almost as often (61%) as those who actually viewed the thief 
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in the lineup (approximately 70%).  This significant difference in bystander identifications 
between the transference and control conditions is the UT effect.   
Additionally, a meta-analysis of 19 independent tests found that when researchers create 
transference conditions, participants are twice as likely to make transference errors when 
compared to control conditions (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006).  Specifically, those 
subjects in the transference conditions committed transference errors 33% of the time, compared 
to only 16% in the control conditions.  Thus, when researchers exposed participants to 
transference conditions, those participants misidentified the bystander as the thief more than 
twice as often as those in the control conditions.   
 Conversely, other studies have found no support for the UT effect (Dysart, Lindsay, 
Hammond, & Dupuis, 2001; Geiselman, Haghighi & Stowe, 1996; Geiselman, MacArthur, & 
Meerovitch, 1993; Read et al. 1990; Experiments 1, 3, & 4).  For example, in the transference 
condition of Read et al. (1990, Experiment 3), an “innocent” bystander would enter a store and 
ask a specific store clerk if he had seen a woman and small child as he (the bystander) was 
supposed to meet with his wife and child at this store.  In the control condition, the clerk had no 
interaction or viewing of the bystander.  After the bystander had interacted with the clerk, the 
perpetrator then entered the store and asked the same clerk to exchange a five-dollar bill for five 
dollars worth of quarters.  Approximately 48 to 96 hours later, the experimenters returned and 
asked the clerks to take a target absent bystander present, target present bystander absent, or both 
(target and bystander) present lineup.  In the target absent bystander present lineup, only 6% of 
the control condition participant’s misidentified the bystander and none of the clerks 
misidentified the bystander in the transference condition.  Similar results were found in the both 
present lineup where the bystander was identified 4.1% of the time in the control condition and 
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5% in the transference condition.  When participants viewed the target present bystander absent 
lineup, they correctly identified the perpetrator 80% of the time in the control condition and 
91.8% of the time in the transference condition.  Similar rates of correct identification in the 
control and transference conditions occurred when participants viewed the both present lineup, 
with correct identification rates at 77.6% and 80%, respectively.  Therefore, Read et al. (1990, 
Experiment 3) found high percentages of correct identifications of the target and corresponding 
low percentages of bystander misidentifications.       
It should be noted here that one of the studies cited above involved participants viewing 
mugshots of potential bystanders instead of viewing them in a video.  Importantly, there is a 
methodological difference between viewing bystanders’ mugshots and viewing bystanders in 
other forms (in person, on film, etc…).  Furthermore, even though Dysart et al. (2001) did not 
find any effect of viewing mugshots on UT, other research using mugshots has revealed a UT 
effect.  Deffenbacher, Bornstein, and Penrod (2006) performed a meta-analysis on 11 different 
studies that exposed participants to mugshots of innocent suspects after the participants had 
viewed a crime.  They found that those that viewed the mugshots were more likely to make a 
transference error (incorrectly believe that the person they chose out of the lineup was the culprit 
when in fact they had seen them previously in the mugbook) than those that had viewed a 
bystander in other forms (e.g., on film or in person).  In the mugbook studies the false 
identification rates were 38% in the transference conditions versus 16% in the control conditions.  
In the studies that exposed participants to the bystander in a different form, the misidentifications 
of the bystander occurred 27% of the time in the transference condition compared to 17% in the 
control condition.  Thus, viewing mugshots before viewing a lineup of suspects sometimes, and 
sometimes does not, produce the UT effect.           
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Furthermore, another study found a reverse UT effect in which the familiar but innocent 
bystander was recognized as familiar but innocent and then disregarded as a possible choice 
(Read et al., 1990 – Experiment 2).  In that experiment, an “innocent” bystander would walk into 
a store in a mall and linger for a few minutes before the “target” would walk in and have an 
interaction with the store clerk or cashier.  After a period of 20 minutes or 2 hours, the clerks 
were approached and asked to pick the “target” out of a lineup.  It was found that clerks in the 
control condition picked the bystander out of the lineup 20% of the time.  However, those in the 
transference condition only picked the bystander 9.7% of the time.  Thus, the bystander was 
identified as the bystander, and not the target, and subsequently disregarded from the clerk’s 
possible choices. 
 
Theoretical Reasons For Unconscious Transference 
 Given the conflicting results presented previously, what is the cause of UT?  Are there 
certain conditions that must be met in order for the effect to occur? According to the literature, 
there are four theoretical possibilities for why UT occurs: automatic processing, deliberate 
source monitoring at retrieval, conscious inferencing, and change blindness (Nelson et al. 2011; 
Ross et al. 1994).   
 
Automatic Processing 
 Automatic processing refers to the idea that our minds encode many details about our 
lives without our conscious awareness (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).  This process occurs without any 
conscious attention or awareness that those details are even being encoded.  It is thought to be 
genetically hard-wired and thus not susceptible to any effects of age or environment.  If 
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automatic processing is the mechanism producing UT then the witness should misidentify the 
familiar bystander without having any conscious recollection of having seen him in a previous 
context.  The presence of the bystander in the lineup should evoke an unconsciously stored 
memory of the bystander that would create a sense of familiarity and thus produce a 
misidentification that would cause the witness to misidentify the bystander.      
 After participants in the Ross et al. (1994) study had viewed the lineup, they were asked 
if the thief was seen anywhere else in the film other than the cafeteria (where he stole the 
money).  If automatic processing had occurred, then the participants in the transference condition 
should have had no memory for the man reading to the children earlier in the video.  However, 
that was not the case.  In the transference condition, 66% of the participants said that the thief 
had been seen previously in the film, and 95% of those people said that he had been reading to 
the children, i.e., the bystander (Experiment 1).  These data lend little support to automatic 
processing as the cause of UT. 
 
Deliberate Source Monitoring At Retrieval 
 Source monitoring errors occur when someone misattributes the events from one time or 
source with another (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).  Using the example above (Loftus, 
1976), this would occur if the ticket agent had remembered seeing both the sailor and a previous 
customer, thought they were two separate people, and misidentified the customer as the thief 
because he was confused with the actual robber. Therefore, the witness would have two separate 
memories for two separate people but confuse one with the other and misremember the bystander 
as the one seen at the scene of the crime. 
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 Evidence against the deliberate source monitoring at retrieval theory can be found when 
examining the context questions from the Ross et al. (1994) study.  If a deliberate source 
monitoring error had occurred, then subjects in the transference condition should have two 
separate memories for the bystander and the thief, and not think that they are the same person.  
However, as stated earlier, 66% of the transference participants thought that the thief had 
appeared earlier in the film, and 95% of them thought that the thief and the bystander were the 
same person (Experiment 1).  Furthermore, in the target absent bystander present lineup 
condition, the participants were asked whether they had seen anyone in the lineup that was in the 
film (other than the thief).  In the transference condition, 76.7% of the participants said that no 
one in the lineup had been seen previously in the film compared to 84.9% in the control 
condition.  The similarity of the response rates in the transference and control conditions 
indicates that the participants did not report having memories for two separate individuals.  As a 
consequence, those memories could not be confused with one another at retrieval, lending little 
support to the notion that deliberate source monitoring at retrieval is the cause of UT.  
 
Conscious Inferencing At Encoding 
The third theoretical approach to UT is called conscious inferencing.  This approach 
suggests that UT occurs when, “the witness misperceives the assailant as the bystander at the 
crime scene and thus makes an erroneous inference that they are the same person” (Ross et al. 
1994, p. 921).  Thus, there are actually two separate memories: one of the bystander and one of 
the thief.  However, the witness mistakenly thinks that they are the same person and thus 
connects the two separate memories.  
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If conscious inferencing is the reason for UT, then the UT effect should be eliminated 
when participants are informed that the culprit and the bystander are indeed two separate people.  
Ross et al. (1994) found that when the participants were informed that the culprit and bystander 
were different people, the UT effect disappeared and there were no differences in bystander 
identification rates between those in the transference (25%) and control (22%) conditions 
(Experiment 2). 
Further, it has been argued that this effect occurs at the encoding of the memory rather 
than at the retrieval during the lineup process.  Ross et al. (1994) examined the percentage of 
participants who thought that the bystander and culprit were the same person both immediately 
before the lineup (evidence of conscious inferencing at encoding) and after they had already 
completed the lineup identification task (evidence of conscious inferencing at retrieval).  They 
found that there were no differences in bystander misidentification rates between the two groups.  
Approximately 72% of the participants said that the thief was seen in another part of the film 
(95% of them said that the thief had been reading to the children) when asked before the lineup, 
and 82% said that the thief had been seen earlier in the film (91% of whom said that the thief had 
been reading to the children) when asked after the lineup.  Taken together, these data suggest that 
conscious inferencing occurs at encoding (Ross et al. 1994; Experiments 3).  
Additionally, conscious inferencing is thought to be a complex process that involves the 
ability to link two independent events together across time and context.  If this were the case, 
then the UT effect would only be seen in participants that had the ability to form a memory of a 
bystander in one context, and then, upon seeing the thief, refer to that bystander memory and 
mistakenly link the two and think that they are the same person.  That is one of the basic 
requirements of conscious inferencing. The witness must be able to make the temporal tag 
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between the events in order to create a composite memory for the event.  If he or she is unable to 
connect these events, then they will not be susceptible to the UT effect.   
Based on this implication, young children would be unlikely to experience the UT effect 
due to the fact that they have difficulty connecting events in memory (Ross et al., 2006).  More 
specifically, Fuzzy Trace Theory proposes that memories consist of two traces: verbatim and 
gist.  Younger children’s memories rely more heavily on specific verbatim information from 
each individual memory, i.e. verbatim traces, (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995).  Conversely, as children 
age and approach adolescence, they become better at connecting information and tend to rely 
more heavily on gist traces.  Gist traces are less susceptible to memory decay, but tend to include 
fewer specific memory cues, and thus the adolescent children don’t remember as much specific 
information from each memory.  Evidence for this developmental difference can be seen in 
children’s performance in the Deese Roediger McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Brainerd, Reyna, & 
Forrest, 2002).  When presented with a list of words (e.g., ice, freezing, chilly, etc…) and then 
later tested for words that are semantically similar to those, but never mentioned (e.g., cold), 
young children have been found to be much less susceptible than adolescents or adults to falsely 
recalling the never-mentioned but semantically associated items (Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 
2002; Metzger et al., 2008).  Contrary to the young children, adolescents and adults form 
meaning or gist-based connections across the presented items, which may, either automatically 
or consciously, trigger the recall of associated items that were not presented.  Additionally, as 
children age, their inferential processing abilities also develop which means that they can better 
infer that two individuals that look similar to one another may be the same person (Pezdek, 
1980).  Taken together, Fuzzy Trace Theory and developments in inferential processing ability 
suggest that as children age, they will become more susceptible to the UT effect.  
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Furthermore, the conscious inferencing theory of UT posits that the elderly (ages 71 and 
over) will also be less susceptible to the UT effect.  Specifically, the age related declines in 
memory consolidation or “binding” that have been found in the elderly (Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, 
Mather, & D’Esposito, 2000) are thought to be at least partially responsible for this 
developmental difference.  Mitchell et al. (2000) found that compared to younger adults, older 
adults had greater difficulty in consolidating information from multiple sources.  This difficulty 
would make older adults less susceptible to the UT effect, as they would not be able to 
consciously infer that the bystander and the thief are the same person.       
These developmental hypotheses were examined in Ross et al. (2006) wherein children 5-
12 years of age participated in the same procedure as described above (Ross et al. 1994) and 
Ross et al. (2005) with middle aged and elderly participants ages 40-90.  Consistent with the 
theory of conscious inferencing, the authors only found the UT effect in children older than 11-
12 years old and adults younger than 70 years old. When participants view the transference video 
and then completed a culprit absent bystander present lineup, 64% of the 11-12 year-olds and 
40% of the 40-70 year-olds misidentified the bystander as the thief.  These percentages are 
consistent with the Ross et al. (1994) study, in which 61% of the participants made the same 
identification error.   
When participants viewed the control video and then completed the culprit absent 
bystander present lineup 40% of the 11-12 year old children and 22% of the 40-70 year olds 
misidentified the bystander. These percentages are again consistent with the Ross et al. (1994) 
study that found that control participants misidentified the bystander 22% of the time.  
Furthermore, significant differences in bystander identifications were found in the transference 
and control conditions for both the 11-12 year olds and the 40-70 year olds.  There were no 
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significant differences in bystander identification rates between the transference and control 
conditions for the 5-10 year old children or the 71-90 year old adults.  
Additionally, Ross et al. (2005, 2006) also examined rates of correct identifications of the 
thief when he was present in the lineup.  When Ross et al. (2006) had participants view the 
control film and then participate in a culprit present bystander absent lineup, the children ages 
11-12 correctly identified the thief 89% of the time, compared to 45% in the 5-6 year olds, 60% 
in the 7-8 year olds, and 64% in the 9-10 year olds.  Conversely, in Ross et al. (2005), there were 
no differences across age groups.  Specifically, participants 50-60 years old correctly identified 
the thief 52.4% of the time, compared with 48.8% for the 61-70 year olds and 46.5% for the 71-
90 year olds.  Thus, the children improved with development while the elderly showed no 
significant differences between ages 50 to 90.   
 Taken together, these two studies (Ross et al. 2005, 2006) lend further support to the 
notion that conscious inferencing is a probable cause of UT.  Young children (ages 5-10) and the 
elderly (ages 71-90) have greater difficulty connecting events and making the conscious 
inference that the bystander and the thief are the same person; thus they are less susceptible to 
the UT effect.   
 
Change Blindness 
A more recent theoretical approach to the UT effect is that it results from change 
blindness (Nelson et al. 2011).  Change blindness is defined as a phenomenon that takes place 
when a person fails to notice major changes in their surroundings from one instance to another 
(Simons & Levin, 1998).  In the Simons and Levin (1998) study, an experimenter would ask a 
pedestrian for directions, and then two men carrying a large door would walk between the 
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experimenter and pedestrian, interrupting their conversation.  While the door was in the way, the 
experimenters would change and after the door had passed, a new experimenter had replaced the 
original one.  When that occurred approximately half of the participants failed to notice the 
change between the experimenters.  
In a study by Nelson et al. (2011), participants were shown a video of a crime.  In one 
condition (the no change condition), the thief shown stealing the money was the same person 
shown exiting the building.  However, in another condition (the actor change condition), the thief 
was shown stealing the money, and a similar but innocent foil (someone who is not the thief) was 
shown leaving the building.  Participants in both conditions were then shown a simultaneous 
lineup that contained the thief who stole the money, the innocent bystander, and four additional 
foils, i.e. a both present lineup.  When asked to pick the thief out of the lineup, in the no change 
condition, 64% correctly identified the thief and only 9% chose the bystander.  However, in the 
actor change condition, only 36% of the participants correctly identified the thief, compared with 
35% who chose the bystander.  Additionally, only 4.5% of the participants in the actor change 
condition actually noticed the change, the other 95% did not see that the video had switched 
from the thief to the bystander.  Thus, the authors argue that the mistaken identifications were 
due to change blindness and the fact that the participants thought the thief and bystander were the 
same individual.  
Although both the change blindness and conscious inference explanations for UT effect 
posit that the witness has a memory for one individual during two separate events, there is a 
fundamental difference between the two: that of time.  Change blindness typically occurs 
instantaneously.  In the previous research, one person is immediately switched out for another 
(Simons & Levin, 1998).  However, the conscious inferencing theory does not have that time 
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restriction.  In the Ross et al. (1994) experiments, the bystander is actually seen before the thief, 
and they are seen several minutes apart. Another theoretical distinction that can be made between 
change blindness and conscious inferencing is that of depth of processing.  Change blindness 
may be a shallow, virtually automatic process due to the fact that roughly 50% of the people 
don’t notice the change.  Conversely, an argument can be made that conscious inferencing 
requires deeper processing.  When an individual sees the thief in the end of the film, they have to 
consciously link the event and the face of the thief to the one of the bystander seen previously.  
Conscious inferencing may happen without conscious awareness, but due to the fact that it has 
the ability to link events across a time delay, an argument could be made that it requires more 
depth of processing than change blindness.      
 
Boundary Conditions For Unconscious Transference 
  Due to the lack of a clear consensus in the literature, with some studies finding 
significant UT effects while others failing to do so, it is paramount to discuss some 
methodological conditions that must be met in order for the UT effect to occur.  Ross et al. 
(1994) posited that the UT effect would occur only when the thief and the bystander appear 
similar to one another.  If the bystander is not very similar, then there will be no chance for 
confusion, and if they look too much alike, then the thief and bystander will be chosen at the 
same rates across all conditions.  Thus, the bystander must be moderately, but not highly similar 
to the thief in order for UT to happen.  Support for this supposition can be found in Read et al. 
(1990, Experiment 1).  In that experiment, the bystander was rated as having low similarity to the 
target and in fact none of the participants selected the bystander in either a target absent 
bystander present lineup or a both present lineup (both the bystander and target were shown). 
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Additionally, the event/interaction with the bystander must be salient enough to create a 
memory trace for it, but it cannot be too salient or the witness will have a strong enough memory 
trace that he or she will not mistakenly believe that the bystander and the culprit are the same 
individual.  Read et al. (1990, Experiment 2) believed that this overly salient interaction was the 
reason for the reverse transference effect that they found.  Specifically, the interaction between 
the clerk and the bystander was so salient that the clerk was able to recognize the bystander as 
the bystander and thus eliminate him from the list of possible targets resulting in the bystander 
being chosen more in the control condition (20%) than the transference condition (9%).    
 
Sequential Lineup Effects on Eyewitness Memory 
 In all of the studies on UT discussed above, there has been one common methodological 
feature used throughout: the simultaneous lineup procedure.  Simultaneous lineups involve the 
witness viewing all of the suspects in a lineup at the same time.  Simultaneous lineups allow for 
relative judgments to be used, where the suspect can compare all of the faces in the lineup to the 
one that they remember and pick the “best fit” out of four to six possibilities (Lindsay & Wells, 
1985).  In other words, the witness can compare all of the faces to each other and find the one 
that is most similar to the perpetrator.  However, this means that the witness may not really be 
choosing the perpetrator, but rather the person that most resembles him or her.  Witnesses can 
use this relative judgment strategy regardless of the accuracy of the identification; i.e. both 
accurate and inaccurate witnesses make can make these mistakes (Ross et al. 2007).  One 
possible solution for this problem is that a different procedure can be used: the sequential lineup.  
The sequential lineup involves the witness being shown a picture or mugshot of each suspect 
individually (Lindsay & Wells, 1985).  The witness has to make a yes/no determination of the 
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guilt of the suspect and is not allowed to return to a mugshot once they have made their decision.  
The witness must make an absolute (yes/no) judgment for each suspect, which has been shown to 
reduce false identifications, with a less significant reduction in correct identifications (Lindsay & 
Wells, 1985; Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001; Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011). 
 However, while the sequential lineup procedure advocates the use of a judgment strategy 
that is conducive to fewer false identifications, there are also some distinct disadvantages to the 
procedure. In a recent meta-analysis of over 70 studies that examined sequential and 
simultaneous lineups, Steblay, Dysart, and Wells (2011) did find that sequential lineups resulted 
in 22% fewer errors than simultaneous lineups.  Additionally, participants that engaged in 
sequential lineup procedures had a 21% advantage in correct rejections, meaning that witnesses 
were more likely to say that the culprit was not in the lineup when he or she really was not.  On 
the other hand, those that viewed a simultaneous lineup had a 14% advantage in correctly 
identifying the culprit when the culprit was actually present in the lineup.  Thus, both types of 
lineup procedures have their advantages and disadvantages, and it is unclear which lineup 
procedure is truly superior.        
Ross et al. (2014) sought to examine whether or not a sequential lineup procedure would 
reduce or eliminate UT.  The same stimulus materials from the Ross et al. (1994) study were 
used.  Participants were recruited under the guise of a preschool education study and asked to 
watch a video about teaching.  At the end of the video, there was a crime. Those in the 
transference condition watched a video in which a familiar but innocent bystander read a book to 
children before the theft took place and those in the control condition watched a video with a 
woman instead of a man reading to the children.  After the video, participants viewed either a 
thief present bystander absent lineup or a thief absent bystander present lineup.  
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In order to make comparisons across studies that took place nearly 20 years apart, the 
authors compared the results of the context questions asked after the lineup identification 
procedure.  In both the Ross et al. (1994) and Ross et al. (2014) studies, the authors asked the 
participants if the robber was seen in any place in the film other than in the cafeteria where the 
money was stolen.  Ross et al. (1994) noted that 66% of participants in the transference condition 
(collapsed across both thief present and bystander present lineups) reported that the robber was 
seen previously in the film; Ross et al. (2014) reported a similar percentage (60%) of participants 
in the transference condition (again collapsed across lineup condition) who reported the same 
thing: that the robber was seen previously in the film.  
  When comparing their results to those of Ross et al. (1994), the authors found a 
dramatic reduction in UT using a sequential lineup.  When Ross et al. (2014) compared their data 
to that of Ross et al. (1994), the incorrect identification rates of the bystander in the transference 
and control conditions dropped from 61% and 22% (transference and control) to 17% and 9%, 
respectively.   
However, correct identifications of the thief also dropped from 75% and 64% 
(transference and control) in the 1994 data to 28% and 22% in the 2014 data.  Thus, UT was 
drastically reduced by using a sequential lineup procedure, but at the cost of correctly identifying 
the culprit.  The authors theorized that the participants were waiting for a best possible match to 
occur and ran out of faces before selecting one.  This is evidenced by the fact that in the Ross et 
al. (1994) data, for the participants who viewed a culprit absent bystander present lineup, 33.7% 
of the participants in the transference condition and 64.4% of the participants in the control 
condition said that the culprit was not in the lineup.  This is compared to 68% and 77% 
(transference and control) in the Ross et al. (2014) data.  Additionally, when the authors looked 
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at the percentage of responses of “not in lineup” in the culprit present bystander absent lineup, 
they saw that the percentages in the Ross et al. (1994) data for transference and control (19.4% 
and 30.5% respectively) also increased in the Ross et al. (2014) data (60% and 61%, transference 
and control).  Thus, significantly more participants chose the “not in lineup” option in the Ross et 
al. (2014) data than the Ross et al. (1994) data.   However, in the Ross et al. (2014) study, the 
participants were never told how many faces they would be seeing in the sequential lineup.  This 
is an example of a methodological characteristic known as backloading, which can alter the 
effects of using sequential and simultaneous lineups.   
 
Backloading in the Sequential Lineup 
 Backloading a sequential lineup involves leading the participants to believe that there will 
be more faces in the lineup than there actually are.  This can be methodologically accomplished 
in several ways.  Many researchers do not tell participants how many faces they will see in the 
sequential lineup (e.g. Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, & Goodsell, 2009; Sauer, Brewer, & Wells, 
2008).  Other researchers attempt to get participants to believe that they will see more photos in 
the lineup than they actually will either by explicitly telling them (e.g., Carlson, Gronlund & 
Clark, 2008) or by putting extra lines on a response sheet (Lindsay, Lea, & Fulford, 1991). Some 
research has shown that if participants know how many faces they will see, their selection 
decisions will be different than if they do not know the correct number (Horry, Palmer, & 
Brewer, 2012).   
Horry, Palmer, and Brewer (2012) had participants come in one at a time and sit down 
with an experimenter.  Another student then stepped out from around a corner 10 meters away 
and stood there for 10 seconds.  The participant was instructed to try to remember the “culprit.”  
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Then the participant was told that he or she would view a sequential lineup of 6 (no 
backloading), 12 (low backloading), or 30 (high backloading) photos and that once he or she 
picked someone out of the lineup that the lineup was over and they would not be able to see any 
other suspects.  
 When the thief was absent from the lineup, the highest backloading condition (30 faces) 
had a greater percentage of correct lineup rejections (84.9%) than the lower backloading and no 
backloading conditions (average across conditions was 60.5%).  Additionally, foils were more 
likely to be chosen from the non-backloaded lineup (20%) than the high backloading lineup 
(6.1%) when the thief was not in the lineup.  Thus, it appears that the participants were waiting 
for a “best match” to their memory trace and did not find one before the lineup was concluded.  
This means that the participants made a selection significantly less often in the high backloading 
condition, and that was advantageous due to the fact that the actual culprit was not in the lineup.  
On the other hand, when the thief was present in the lineup, those in the backloading 
conditions (12 and 30 faces) were significantly less likely to pick the thief, 43.3% and 40.3% 
respectively, than the no backloading (6 faces) condition (56.1%).  Furthermore, as the amount 
of backloading increased, the participants were more and more likely to incorrectly reject the 
lineup.  Incorrect lineup rejection rates rose from 20.25% in the no backloading condition to 
38.43% in the low backloading condition, to 48.58% in the high backloading condition.  
Participants ran out of faces to see without choosing anyone more often in the backloaded 
conditions than the non-backloaded conditions.  Thus, it appears that the participants were again 
waiting for a “best match” to the individual that they had in their memory, but did not see one 
that they were confident enough to choose before they ran out of choices. 
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Further evidence for this waiting effect can be seen in Dysart and Lindsay (2001).  The 
authors in that study had participants view a video of a staged crime and then later participate in 
a lineup identification task.  Approximately one third of the participants viewed a target absent 
sequential lineup.  Those participants were led to believe that they would be viewing 15 photos 
in the lineup, however they actually only saw six.  Only 2.5% of the participants incorrectly 
identified a foil in the lineup.  All of the others correctly rejected the lineup.  This was compared 
to 35.7% of participants that viewed a target absent sequential lineup.  Thus, it appears that the 
participants in the Dysart and Lindsay (2001) study were waiting for a best possible match and 
did not find one and subsequently correctly rejected the lineup.  Based on these results, it appears 
that backloading the lineup can cause participants to wait for a best possible match, which helps 
to reduce false positive identifications, but at the cost of also reducing the percentage of correct 
identifications.   
 
The Present Study 
So how will knowing the correct number of faces affect UT?  In the Ross et al. (2014) 
study, the participants were not told how many faces they were going to see and that reduced the 
negative effects of unconscious transference, but it also caused a reduction in the number of 
correct identifications. Due to the fact that 64% of the transference participants and 69% of the 
control participants rejected the lineup and stated that the thief was not present, it was theorized 
that they were waiting for a “best option” choice and simply ran out of faces from which to 
choose from.  Therefore the present study will seek to examine whether or not knowing the exact 
number of faces to be seen will affect the percentage of incorrect identifications, and thus UT. 
Furthermore, the results of this experiment will be compared to Ross et al. (1994, 2006, & 2014) 
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so that the effect of backloading condition (not told anything, i.e. backloading vs. told correct 
number of faces, i.e. no backloading) can be compared. The study design is a 2 (notification 
condition: nothing versus correct number of faces) x 2 (experimental condition: transference 
versus control) x 2 (lineup condition: culprit present, bystander absent versus culprit absent, 
bystander present) factorial. 
 
Hypotheses 
H1: If the participants are waiting for the “best choice” to come up, then when they are 
told the correct number of faces (no backloading), they will be less likely to make a selection of 
“not in lineup” and more likely to select one of the members of the lineup. 
H2: Compared with a simultaneous lineup, and a sequential lineup that does not tell the 
witness how many faces are available to view, participants in the notification condition (told 
there are five potential faces) and who are in the transference condition, should be significantly 
more likely to misidentify the familiar bystander and make the UT error than those in the control 
condition. Informing the participants of the correct number of faces to be shown should reduce 
the likelihood of them waiting for the best match and running out of lineup photos. The results 
will be an increased likelihood of 1): identifying the familiar bystander as the thief, and 2) 
correctly identifying the thief when shown a thief present, bystander absent lineup. 
H3: If the sequential lineup method helps to reduce unconscious transference, and not 
backloading a lineup helps to increase the odds of participants choosing a suspect from the 
lineup, then the rates of identification of the bystander in the transference condition will be 
greater than Ross et al. (2014) and lower than Ross et al. (1994).   
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CHAPTER II	  
METHOD 	  
	  
	  
Participants	  
 A total of 185 participants were be recruited for this study from entry and upper level 
undergraduate and graduate psychology courses at The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.  
These students may have been offered extra credit in those classes by their professors for 
participation.  Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 43 with a mean age of 20.51 (SD = 3.164).  
Participants included 141 females (76.2%) and 41 males (22.2%).   Of the 185 participants, 
75.5% identified as Caucasian, 17.5% as African American, 3.8% as Hispanic/Latino, and 3.3% 
as Asian/Pacific Islander.	  
A manipulation check question was used to make sure that participants were aware of the 
number of faces to be seen.  Overall, 13% (N=24) participants failed the manipulation check 
leaving a total of 161 participants’ responses that were analyzed.  This final sample had age, 
gender, and racial compositions that were not different from the total sample.   
 
Materials	  
Each participant was seated at a desk with a flat panel computer monitor placed within a 
transparent viewport. The viewport was covered in tinted glass in order to prevent any glare on 
the monitor. Plastic viewing visors were placed atop each viewport and prevented participants 
from viewing one another’s responses. The stimulus film was projected on a screen that is 5¾ ft. 
wide by 6 ft. tall. E-Prime 1.2 was used to present the lineup photographs and to measure the 
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reaction times of participants and to collect context and demographic data (Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc., 2002). 	  
	  
E-Prime	  
 The program that was used to display the lineup, and record responses has been written 
in E-Studio, which is the programming aspect of E-Prime. (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 
2002). Participants used the program to perform the task of the sequential lineup identification, 
to respond to context and demographic questions, a word association task, and to perform a 
series of Equation Analysis Tasks. 	  
	  
Stimulus Film	  
The stimulus film, procedure, and lineups that were used in the present study are the 
same as those used by Ross, et al. (1994; 2006; 2007; 2014). The film has been designed to 
portray the “Day in the Life of a Preschool Teacher” and it displays teachers interacting with 
children in a preschool setting. The film consists of ten different segments that ranged from 30 to 
90 seconds long each. In each of these segments preschool teachers are shown interacting with 
children. The films shown to the subjects in the transference and control conditions was the same 
except for one segment where a teacher was shown reading a story to the children. In the 
transference condition a male was shown reading the story to the children and that person served 
as the familiar but innocent bystander that was later presented in the lineup. In the control 
condition, a female teacher read a story to the children. All other aspects of the films shown to 
the transference and control participants were identical.  The theft and bystander segments were 
each 34 seconds long, with the same amount of exposure to both the thief and the bystander. 	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Near the end the film the female victim tells another teacher that she is going to take a 
break in the cafeteria. The teacher then walked into the cafeteria, and sat down at a table with the 
male thief; she then removed her wallet from her purse, and took out a one-dollar bill. Next, she 
placed her wallet on the table, stood up, and walked to a vending machine with her back to the 
thief. While the victim’s back was turned, the thief picked up the victim’s wallet, and removed 
the remaining money. He then placed the wallet back on the table, put the money in his pocket, 
and left while the teacher was still at the vending machine with her back to him. The film ended 
when the thief left the room and the screen faded to black. The participants were then informed 
about the true nature of the study in that it was about eyewitness memory and not preschool 
education.  	  
	  
Lineup Construction	  
The lineups are the same as those used by Ross et al. (1994; 2006; 2007; 2014) and have 
been constructed so that the bystander is more similar to the thief than any other foil in the lineup 
which Ross et al. (1994; 2006; 2007; 2014) posit is a necessary condition for UT to occur.  The 
photographs are head and shoulder shots that are in color, were taken by a professional 
photographer, and are identical in lighting source, brightness, background, clothing, and distance 
from the camera. 	  
Ross et al. (1994) constructed their lineup by recruiting participants (76 college students) 
to compare 47 pairs of color photographs of men with similar physical characteristics (20 to 25 
years old; black or dark brown hair). Subjects were shown 47 pairs of photographs in which the 
photograph on the subject’s left was that of the person who played the thief in the film, and the 
photograph on the right was that of a potential lineup foil. Subjects were then asked to rate the 
similarity of each foil, and the bystander, to the thief. These foils were rated on a 7-point Likert 
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scale format (1 = not at all similar, 4 = moderately similar, and 7 = very similar), and the mean 
level of similarity between each foil and the thief was calculated. The lineup consisted of 4 foils, 
1 bystander, and the thief. The four foils that were in the lineup fell around the median for the 
whole 47 foils tested, their means range from 2.48 to 2.65 meaning that they range from no, to 
moderate similarity to the thief (the point of comparison). The bystander had a mean rating of 
3.97 indicating that he was seen as being more similar to the thief than the other foils selected. 
This procedure satisfied the requirement to create a lineup where the innocent bystander is more 
similar to the thief than any other foil in the lineup. 	  
	  
Procedure	  	  
Students were recruited to participate in a study on “Preschool Education,” and may have 
been offered extra credit for their participation, or consideration of participation according to 
their course instructors’ guidelines. Participants were run in groups no larger than 10, and were 
seated at preselected numbered spaces in a computer lab.  Subjects were assigned in a block-
randomized design such that all the participants in a given session saw the same video and lineup 
conditions. At the beginning of the sessions the participants were told that they were about to 
participate in a study about psychology and education. The participants were then asked to take a 
seat at one of the ten computer desks and informed by the experimenter that the study was 
focusing on ways to attract people to a career in preschool teaching. They were then told that 
they would see a video as a part of this study, and would be asked to give their opinions and 
reactions to the film. Before the film started, and the lights lowered, the participants were asked 
to fill out the informed consent (Appendix A). Both versions of the film (transference and 
control) lasted 4 minutes 5 seconds.  55 participants saw the transference video (i.e., bystander 
and thief are present in the video) and then participated in a thief absent, bystander present 
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lineup.  58 participants viewed the control video (i.e., only the thief is present) and then 
participated in a thief absent, bystander present lineup.  Finally, 48 participants viewed the 
control video and participated in a thief present bystander absent lineup. 	  
After seeing the video (either transference or control) participants were informed as to the 
true nature of the study, and asked to participate in the lineup portion of the study. The 
participants were informed that they would be seeing a series of faces one at a time on their 
computer. They were instructed that they were to try to identify the thief who stole the money 
from the wallet or indicate that the thief was not in the series of faces. Participants were also told 
that they could not go back and look at previously seen faces once they have answered yes, or no 
to a face. Additionally, on two separate occasions, participants were explicitly told the number of 
faces that they would see. Finally, they were informed that the person who stole the money may 
or may not be in the series of faces that were about to see. The full instructions are included in 
Appendix B.	  
When participants began the lineup task, each face appeared on the screen in sequence, 
and the program would only move on to the next face when the participant had answered with 
one of the only two buttons the program allowed (1 = no and 2 = yes). After they had answered 
yes or no for each face they were also asked to rate their confidence in their decision on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = not at all confident; 4 = moderately confident; 7 = extremely confident). After 
they concluded with the lineup portion of the study there was a manipulation check question that 
asked the number of faces that the participant was supposed to see.  This was to make sure that 
the participant was fully aware of the manipulation and knew that they could have seen up to five 
faces.  After the participants were done with the lineup portion of the study, they were asked to 
answer a series of context and demographic questions. The context questions asked about 
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specifics in the film and the lineup task such as whether or not the thief had been seen at any 
other time in the film, if there were any male teachers in the film and their description, and if 
there was anyone in the lineup that was also present in the film. The full list of context questions 
are included in Appendix C.	  
Additionally, demographic questions were asked about the participants’ age, sex/gender, 
race/ethnicity, their education level, their parents’ education level (one at a time), current 
occupation, first language, eyesight, caffeine intake, and amount of sleep prior to participating in 
this study in order to see if any of these variables affect the results in any way.  Similar 
demographic characteristics were collected in Ross et al. (2014) and these questions were 
collected here to ensure comparison across samples.  A complete list of demographic questions 
are located in Appendix D.  After the participants completed the context and demographic 
questions, they attempted to complete a series of Word Association Tasks (e.g., they were given 
the words wall, sweeper, and lamp, and told to find one word that could be used in conjuncture 
with those three, in this case the word is street: wall street, street sweeper, and street lamp), and a 
series of Equation Analysis Tasks (e.g. they will be given a sentence like 7 W. of the A. W., and 
have to figure out what the capitalized letters stand for, 7 Wonders of the Ancient World) to keep 
them busy, so they would not engage in behavior that would distract others. After the 
participants completed the tasks they were debriefed, and thanked for their participation.  The 
entire session took an estimated average of 30-45 minutes to complete. 	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CHAPTER III	  
RESULTS	  
	  
	  
	  
In order for our results to be comparable to Ross et al. (1994) and Ross et al. (2014), we 
first examined the percentage of participants that viewed the transference video and subsequently 
stated that the thief was seen previously in the film.  Our analysis showed that 65.5% of the 
participants who viewed the transference video stated that they had seen the thief previously in 
the film; that percentage is comparable to that of Ross et al. (1994) where the percentage was 
66% and to Ross et al. (2014) where the percentage was 60%.  Therefore, even though 
participants were not randomly assigned to viewing conditions (simultaneous, sequential 
backloaded, or sequential non-backloaded), it appears that across studies participants were 
encoding the stimulus information similarly.  Additionally, the mean age of participants in the 
present study (20.51 years) does not differ from Ross et al. (1994) (mean age of 18.2 years) or 
Ross et al. (2014) (mean age of 19.9 years). 
 
Overall Percentage of Choosers 
In order to ascertain the overall effect of knowing the correct number of faces, a z-test on 
proportion was calculated to examine the rates of choosing anyone (bystander, thief, or foil) from 
the lineup across studies.  As predicted in hypothesis one, significantly more participants chose 
someone from the lineup in the present study (47.9%) compared to the Ross et al. (2014) study 
(34.4%), z=2.928, p < .003. 
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Thief Absent Bystander Present Lineup 
Next, we examined the participants that viewed the culprit absent bystander present 
lineup.  As can be seen in Table 1 below, participants who viewed the transference video were 
significantly more likely to misidentify the bystander as the thief than those that viewed the 
control video (36.4% vs. 13.8%), z = 2.831, p < .005.  This result supports the first part of 
hypothesis two that knowing the correct number of faces to be seen would increase the 
percentage of misidentifications of the bystander. 
 
Table 1  Rate of bystander misidentification by condition: bystander present/thief absent 
lineup. 
 
 Bystander (%) Foil (%) Not in lineup (%) 
 
Transference 
 
36.4* 
 
14.5 
 
49.1 
Control 13.8 27.6 62.1 
*(z test on proportion, p < .005)  
   Note. Sample size = 55 for transference, 58 for control 
 
 
 
Further analyses were conducted to compare the results of the present study to previous 
studies.  Table 2 shows the comparison of the misidentification rates of the bystander in the 
present study to those in Ross et al. (1994) and Ross et al. (2014).  In order to test the prediction 
of hypothesis three, separate z-tests on proportions were conducted.  The results showed 
significant differences between the present data and Ross et al. (1994), z = 2.949, p < .003, as 
well as Ross et al. (2014), z = 2.567, p < .01.  
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Table 2 Rate of bystander misidentification by condition and study: bystander present/thief 
absent lineup. 
 
 Ross et al. (1994) Ross et al. (2014) Present Study 
Transference 60.9% 17% 36.4% 
Control 21.9% 9% 13.8% 
 
 
Thief Present Bystander Absent Lineup 
 Additional analyses were conducted to examine the percentage of participants who 
correctly identified the thief from a thief present, bystander absent lineup.  A z-test on proportion 
revealed that significantly more people correctly identified the thief (37.5%) than misidentified 
an innocent foil (14.6%), z = 2.620, p < .009.  The percentages of correct identification and 
incorrect identification and lineup rejection can be seen below in Table 3.    
 
Table 3  Rate of thief identification by condition: thief present/bystander absent lineup. 
 
 Foil (%) Thief (%) Not in lineup (%) 
 
Control 14.6 37.5* 47.9 
*(z test on proportion, p < .00)  
Note. Sample size = 48 
 
 
 Next, we compared the rates of correct identification of the thief to those of Ross et al. 
(1994) and Ross et al. (2014).  Although the percentage of correct identifications did increase 
from 28% in the Ross et al. (2014) data to 37.5% in the present study, z tests on proportions 
revealed no significant difference between the studies, z = 1.134, p > .05.  This result is contrary 
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to the second part of hypothesis two that knowing the correct number of faces to be seen would 
increase the percentage of correct identifications. However, there was a significant difference 
between the present data and those of Ross et al. (1994), z = 2.454, p < .01.  Specifically, more 
correct identifications were made in the Ross et al. (1994) study (63.9%) than in the present 
study (37.5%).  Table 4 shows the comparison of these percentages across studies.  
 
Rate of thief identification by condition and study: thief present/bystander absent 
lineup. 
 
*p < .05 (z test on proportion) 
 	  
Table 4  
 
   
Ross et al. (1994) Ross et al. (2014) Present study 
     Control 63.9%* 28% 37.5% 
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CHAPTER IV	  
DISCUSSION	  
	  
	  
	  
Overall, results supported our first hypothesis in that significantly more witnesses made a 
lineup selection (thief, bystander, or foil) when they knew the correct number of faces than when 
they did not.  It appears that participants felt more pressure to make a selection than in the Ross 
et al. (2014) study.  Additionally, we found partial support of our second hypothesis.  Compared 
to individuals who were not informed, those who knew the exact number of faces to be viewed 
were more likely to incorrectly identify the bystander. However, while the number of 
participants who did correctly identify the thief when he was present did increase when the 
correct number of faces to be seen was known (25% to 36.5%), this difference was not 
significant.  Furthermore, we found support for our third hypothesis in that participants in the 
present study were significantly more likely to misidentify the bystander as the thief compared to 
Ross et al. (2014), but significantly less likely to make the misidentification error compared to 
the participants in Ross et al. (1994).  Thus, participants who view a simultaneous lineup are the 
most likely to make the UT error and mistakenly misidentify the familiar but innocent bystander 
as the thief, followed by those that view a sequential lineup and know the correct number of 
faces to be seen, and then those that view a sequential lineup and do not know the correct 
number of faces to be seen.  Comparisons to existing literature are discussed below. 
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Unconscious Transference 
 When examining the existence of the UT effect, the present study found a significant 
difference between transference and control conditions, thus reinstating the effect when 
compared to Ross et al. (2014).  Furthermore, we demonstrated that sequential lineups can 
reduce the UT effect by both reducing the number of people who misidentify the familiar but 
innocent bystander after viewing the transference video (61% in simultaneous lineup compared 
to 23.9% in sequential lineups) and also by reducing the difference between transference and 
control conditions (39% in simultaneous lineup compared to 13.1% in sequential lineups).  
Additionally, backloading the sequential lineup further reduces both the number of participants 
who misidentify the bystander to 17% and also further reduces the difference between 
transference and control conditions to 8%.  Moreover, when the sequential lineup was 
backloaded, the UT effect was barely significant in a lenient one tailed test whereas the non-
backloaded sequential and simultaneous lineups showed differences that were stronger in a more 
conservative test. 
 Therefore, if our aim is to fully reduce or eliminate the existence of the UT error, then 
showing eyewitnesses a backloaded sequential lineup is the most successful identification 
method that we have explored.  A backloaded sequential lineup results in the fewest transference 
errors and the smallest UT effect.  However, the same techniques that reduced the UT error, 
sequential lineups and backloading, also resulted in the fewest correct identifications of the thief. 
 
Sequential and Simultaneous Lineups 
 When comparing the results of the present study to those or Ross et al. (1994; 2014), we 
found that participants who viewed the sequential lineup had a 49.2% advantage in correct 
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rejections of the thief absent lineup.  This finding is consistent with previous research that found 
sequential advantages in correct rejections of 23% (Steblay et al. 2001) and 22% (Steblay et al. 
2011).  We also found that participants who viewed a simultaneous lineup had a 42.1% 
advantage in correct identifications of the thief over those who viewed a sequential lineup.  This 
finding is also consistent with previous research demonstrating simultaneous lineup advantages 
of 15% (Steblay et al. 2001) and 14% (Steblay et al. 2011) in correct identification of the suspect 
when the suspect is present in the lineup.  
 Therefore, our findings support the idea that there are advantages and disadvantages to 
using both simultaneous and sequential lineups.  Participants who view a simultaneous lineup are 
better at identifying the suspect when he or she is present, but more susceptible to misidentifying 
an innocent suspect if the correct suspect is not in the lineup.  Furthermore, the advantages to the 
simultaneous and sequential lineups in the present study were much stronger than those found in 
previous research.  One possible reason for this is that we are only comparing the results of three 
studies whereas the Steblay et al. (2011) article is a meta-analysis that compared the results of 72 
different studies.  It is possible that with more research into the effects of simultaneous and 
sequential lineups on UT that these larger differences would be reduced.  Furthermore, the 
present study found significant differences in identification rates between simultaneous and 
sequential lineup participants whereas the Steblay et al. (2011) meta-analysis included some 
studies that did not find significant differences between the two which may have reduced the 
advantage of one lineup methodology over the other.      
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Backloading The Sequential Lineup 
 Informing participants of the number of faces to be seen in a sequential lineup increased 
the percentage of correct identification of the thief from 25% to 36.5%, although this was not 
statistically significant.  This is consistent with the findings of Horry, Palmer, and Brewer (2012) 
who found that participants made more correct identifications of the suspect when they knew the 
correct number of faces to be seen (56.1%) than when the lineup was backloaded with 6 or 24 
faces (43.3% and 40.3% respectively).   
Additionally, we found that backloading the lineup decreased correct rejection rates of 
the bystander from 72.5% to 55.7%.  This result is also consistent with previous literature 
(Lindsay, Lea, & Fulford, 1991, Experiment 3; Horry, Palmer, & Brewer, 2012).  Specifically, 
participants in the Lindsay, Lea, and Fulford study (1991, Experiment 3) were more likely to 
make a false identification when they were told the correct number of lineup members (16.7%) 
than when the lineup was backloaded by not telling them anything about the number of faces to 
be seen (6.8%).  Additionally, participants in the Horry, Palmer, and Brewer study (2012) 
correctly rejected the target absent lineup more often when the lineup was backloaded with 6 or 
24 faces (63.3% and 83.6%, respectively) than when they were told the correct number of faces 
to be seen (49.4%). 
Overall, our findings support the idea that there are advantages and disadvantages to 
backloading a sequential lineup.  Informing participants of the correct number of faces to be seen 
does result in a small increase in the number of correct identifications of the suspect in a suspect 
present lineup.  However, that increase in the number of correct identifications comes at the cost 
of having a smaller percentage of correct rejections of the suspect absent lineup.  Our results are 
consistent with previous literature in finding that backloaded lineups make participants more 
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likely to reject the lineup altogether, and that is advantageous when the suspect is not in the 
lineup, but harmful when he or she is actually present. 
 
Limitations 
 There were several limitations to this study.  First, no participants were shown the 
transference video and then asked to complete the thief present, bystander absent lineup due to 
prioritizing power to other cells.  Future research should address this by examining the effects of 
knowing the correct number of faces when the participants view the transference video and 
subsequently view a thief present, bystander absent lineup.  Additionally, lineup order was not 
manipulated as the thief or the bystander was always seen in the 4th position out of 5 lineup 
members.  Some research has shown that when participants know the correct number of faces to 
be seen, there are more correct identifications of the suspect and more correct rejections of the 
suspect absent lineup when the suspect is shown earlier in the lineup (Horry, Palmer, & Brewer, 
2012).   
Another limitation is that we did not employ a fully randomized design when making 
comparisons.  We compared the results of several studies, some of which were conducted almost 
20 years apart.  Cohort or other similar effects may be affecting our data.  A fully randomized 
factorial design would have given us the best data however that was not feasible due to time 
limitations.  Finally, 13% of participants failed the manipulation check and did not correctly 
report the correct number of faces to be seen.  We are unsure why we had such a high number of 
manipulation check failures.  Answers on the manipulation check covered the whole selection 
range of one to seven.  Outside of the correct answer of five, the other two most prevalent 
responses to the manipulation check question were that of four potential faces to be seen (25% of 
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failures) and seven potential faces to be seen (37.5% of failures).  It is possible that these 
participants were not paying close enough attention to the experimenter, which would explain 
those who selected a higher number of faces that they actually saw.  It is also possible that 
participants misunderstood the question and responded with the number of faces that they 
actually saw, due to the fact that if they made a selection from the lineup, then the lineup ended 
and they were not shown any more faces, this would explain some of those participants who 
selected numbers fewer than five.   
 
Future Directions 
  The next step in this study will be to examine the effects of lineup order on UT using a 
sequential lineup procedure where participants do or do not know the correct number of faces to 
be seen.  This will allow the researchers to determine whether individuals are more likely to 
make an incorrect decision at the beginning or the end of the lineup procedure.  Horry, Palmer, 
and Brewer (2012) also investigated lineup order effects and found no real differences of suspect 
position when the lineup was backloaded.  However, when participants knew the correct number 
of faces to be seen, correct rejections were more likely if the suspect was in position 2 (out of 6) 
and bystander misidentifications were more likely if the target was in position 6 (out of 6).  Thus, 
it appears that placing the suspect earlier in the lineup order both increases correct identifications 
and decreases false identifications when the eyewitness knows the number of faces to be seen.  
 Additionally, future studies should add another manipulation check question that asks the 
participants if knowing the correct number of faces to be seen altered their selection decision or 
criteria.  If the participants are making selection decisions more often, but are not consciously 
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realizing it, then that would advocate even more for police and other law enforcement officials to 
not inform eyewitness of the correct number of faces to be seen in a sequential lineup. 
 Another potential future direction of this study would be to look at the reaction time of 
participants when they know or do not know the number of faces to be seen.  Ross et al. (2014) 
and the present study both collected reaction time data on participants using E-Prime.  That 
reaction time data could be examined to see if participants take more or less time in making 
selection decisions when they know or do not know how many people will be in the lineup.  
Additionally, researchers could also look at whether or not participants take more or less time to 
make their responses as they approach the end of the lineup.  If participants are feeling more 
pressure to make a selection as they approach the end of the lineup, then they should take more 
time to evaluate each member of the lineup and thus have slower reaction times than the 
participants who do now know the number of faces to be seen and are feeling less pressure to 
make a selection.     
 
Implications	  
The results of the present study have significant implications for the law enforcement 
community, even when there is not a familiar bystander in the lineup.  Our findings add to the 
data that show that there are advantages and disadvantages to using both simultaneous and 
sequential lineups.  Simultaneous lineups result in more correct identifications while sequential 
lineups result in more correct rejections of a target absent lineup.  Additionally, our data also 
show that there advantages and disadvantages to backloading a sequential lineup.  If participants 
are told the correct number of faces, they are more likely to make a selection decision, regardless 
of whether or not the suspect is actually in the lineup.  This can lead to a higher number of 
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correct identifications, but it can also lead to a higher number of misidentifications of innocent 
suspects. In fact, the percentage of participants who made the UT error and selected the 
bystander and those who correctly identified the thief were nearly identical, 36.4% and 37.5% 
respectively. 
Therefore, eyewitnesses should not be told the exact number of faces they will view in a 
lineup, as it not only makes them significantly more likely to misidentify an innocent bystander 
in the lineup, but also will not significantly improve the number of correct identifications of the 
thief.  However, both of these methodological comparisons, sequential versus simultaneous and 
backloaded versus non-backloaded have accuracy trade offs.  In each instance one has higher 
rates of correct rejections of suspect absent lineups and the other has higher rates of suspect 
identifications.  Additionally, while it may appear that a non-backloaded sequential lineup is a 
medium ground between a simultaneous lineup and a non-backloaded sequential lineup, it is not 
that simple.  Even though the backloaded sequential lineup has correct rejection and correct 
identification rates in between the other two methodologies, the only significant gains made 
between backloaded and non-backloaded lineups were in bystander misidentifications.  Correct 
identifications of the suspect did increase, but not significantly so.  Thus, it appears that there is 
nothing significant to be gained by informing eyewitnesses to the correct number of faces to be 
seen in the lineup. 
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  this	  study.	  
This	  research	  has	  been	  approved	  by	  the	  University	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  Board.	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Purpose	  of	  the	  research	  study:	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  show	  you	  a	  videotape	  about	  preschool	  education	  and	  to	  assess	  your	  thoughts	  and	  reactions	  to	  it.	  	  
What	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  do	  in	  the	  study:	  You	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  watch	  a	  video	  about	  preschool	  teaching,	  and	  give	  your	  opinions	  and	  reactions	  to	  the	  video.	  	  	  
Time	  required:	  1	  hour	  	  
Risks	  and	  Benefits:	  There	  are	  no	  inherent	  risks	  involved	  with	  participating	  in	  this	  project.	  	  However,	  information	  from	  this	  study	  may	  benefit	  many	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  	  	  
Confidentiality:	  Your	  responses	  to	  any	  questions	  during	  the	  study	  asked	  are	  entirely	  confidential.	  Your	  name	  does	  not	  appear	  anywhere	  on	  the	  questionnaire,	  and	  you	  are	  not	  being	  evaluated	  in	  any	  way.	  	  
Voluntary	  participation:	  Your	  participation	  in	  this	  study	  is	  completely	  voluntary.	  	  
Right	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  study:	  You	  have	  the	  right	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  study	  at	  anytime	  without	  any	  penalty.	  	  
Whom	  to	  contact	  if	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  have	  questions	  about	  the	  study:	  Dr.	  David	  Ross	  (David-­‐Ross@utc.edu)	  Dominick	  Atkinson	  (Dominick-­‐Atkinson@mocs.utc.edu)	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Introduction 	   Thank	  you	  for	  coming	  today.	  My	  name	  is	  ___________,	  and	  we	  appreciate	  your	  participation	  in	  our	  study.	  Today’s	  session	  will	  last	  about	  an	  hour	  and	  I	  would	  like	  you	  to	  please	  listen	  carefully	  to	  the	  instructions	  that	  I’m	  going	  to	  give	  you.	  	  Once	  we	  start	  the	  study	  it	  is	  very	  important	  that	  you	  do	  not	  talk	  to	  anyone.	  	  Please	  turn	  off	  your	  cell	  phones	  or	  switch	  them	  to	  silent	  and	  do	  not	  use	  them	  during	  the	  experiment.	  	  Once	  the	  experiment	  has	  begun,	  it	  cannot	  be	  stopped,	  and	  please	  do	  not	  look	  at	  anyone	  else’s	  computer	  screen	  because	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  your	  individual	  answers.	  	  After	  we	  finish	  the	  study,	  we	  will	  tell	  you	  all	  about	  what	  we	  are	  doing	  and	  can	  answer	  all	  your	  questions.	  	  
 Task at Hand 	  	   You	  are	  participating	  in	  a	  study	  on	  psychology	  and	  education	  conducted	  by	  Dr.	  David	  Ross	  at	  UTC.	  As	  part	  of	  this	  study,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  show	  you	  a	  short	  film	  about	  teaching	  young	  preschool	  children.	  As	  many	  of	  you	  may	  know,	  the	  number	  of	  people	  going	  into	  the	  teaching	  profession,	  especially	  at	  the	  preschool	  level,	  has	  dropped	  dramatically	  over	  the	  last	  several	  years.	  The	  film	  that	  I	  am	  going	  to	  show	  you	  is	  designed	  to	  be	  shown	  to	  college	  students	  in	  hopes	  of	  attracting	  them	  to	  a	  career	  in	  preschool	  teaching.	  It	  shows	  what	  the	  average	  day	  in	  the	  life	  of	  a	  preschool	  teacher	  looks	  like,	  and	  shows	  some	  of	  the	  rewards	  and	  benefits	  of	  being	  a	  teacher.	  So,	  what	  I	  would	  like	  to	  do	  is	  show	  you	  the	  film,	  and	  then	  get	  your	  opinion	  and	  reactions	  to	  it.	  The	  film	  is	  about	  15	  minutes	  long.	  	  	  Do	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  so	  far?	  	  	  	  	   Before	  we	  get	  started,	  there	  is	  a	  sheet	  of	  paper	  called	  an	  Informed	  Consent	  Form.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  normal	  process	  of	  being	  part	  of	  a	  study	  we	  need	  you	  to	  read	  over	  this	  form	  and	  sign	  it	  at	  the	  bottom.	  This	  means	  that	  you	  are	  volunteering	  to	  participate	  in	  our	  study.	  	  Additionally,	  when	  you	  registered	  in	  the	  SONA	  system,	  you	  should	  have	  received	  a	  4	  digit	  identification	  number.	  	  Please	  place	  that	  number	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  sheet.	  	  If	  you	  do	  not	  know	  your	  number,	  it	  should	  be	  in	  the	  initial	  registration	  email	  that	  you	  received	  from	  SONA,	  or	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  any	  of	  the	  reminder	  emails	  that	  you	  received	  about	  this	  session.	  	  	  	  
Present Film 
 
After the Film As	  you	  can	  see	  by	  the	  crime	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  film,	  this	  study	  is	  not	  about	  education	  and	  preschool	  teaching.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  about	  eyewitness	  memory	  and	  your	  ability	  to	  recall	  the	  crime	  you	  have	  just	  seen.	  Our	  goal,	  was	  to	  create	  as	  realistically	  as	  we	  could,	  a	  “crime”	  that	  you	  would	  observe	  without	  you	  knowing	  that	  it	  was	  going	  to	  happen.	  Now,	  I	  would	  like	  you	  to	  put	  yourself	  into	  the	  role	  of	  a	  real	  “eyewitness”	  and	  imagine	  that	  I’m	  a	  police	  detective	  who	  is	  asking	  you	  to	  describe	  your	  memory	  for	  the	  crime.	  	  
	  
Lineup	  Identification	  Now	  what	  I	  want	  to	  do	  is	  show	  you	  a	  series	  of	  photos	  of	  faces.	  When	  you	  view	  the	  photos,	  I	  want	  you	  to	  try	  to	  identify	  the	  thief	  who	  stole	  the	  money	  from	  the	  wallet	  or	  indicate	  that	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the	  thief	  is	  NOT	  in	  the	  series	  of	  faces.	  You	  will	  view	  each	  of	  the	  faces	  one	  at	  a	  time,	  and	  you	  can	  view	  up	  to	  FIVE	  faces.	  	  
You	  cannot	  go	  back	  and	  look	  at	  previously	  seen	  photographs	  once	  you	  have	  
answered	  yes	  or	  no	  to	  a	  face!	  	  After	  you	  are	  done	  with	  the	  photos	  we	  ask	  a	  series	  of	  
questions	  that	  cannot	  be	  returned	  to	  once	  completed.	  	  	  
	  If	  you	  that	  think	  the	  person	  who	  stole	  the	  money	  is	  NOT	  being	  shown,	  then	  you	  will	  press	  the	  1	  key	  on	  the	  keyboard	  to	  indicate	  “NO”	  	  If	  you	  that	  think	  the	  person	  who	  stole	  the	  money	  IS	  being	  shown,	  then	  you	  will	  press	  the	  2	  key	  on	  the	  keyboard	  to	  indicate	  “Yes”	  	  After	  responding	  Yes	  or	  No	  to	  each	  face	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  rate	  how	  confident	  you	  are	  in	  your	  response.	  	  Finally,	  IF	  you	  have	  pressed	  “yes”	  for	  any	  face	  you	  are	  done	  with	  that	  portion	  of	  the	  study,	  and	  will	  not	  see	  anymore	  faces.	  	  Please	  Remember,	  you	  will	  be	  viewing	  up	  to	  FIVE	  faces	  and	  the	  person	  who	  stole	  the	  money	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  in	  the	  series	  of	  faces	  that	  you	  will	  see.	  	  	  	  	  After	  you	  are	  done	  with	  looking	  at	  the	  faces	  the	  computer	  will	  ask	  you	  a	  series	  of	  questions,	  and	  then	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  complete	  a	  series	  of	  tasks.	  	  Do	  you	  have	  any	  questions?	  	  You	  can	  now	  begin.	  	  Please	  Press	  the	  Spacebar	  to	  start.	  	  	  
 
	  	  
Debriefing 	  	   As	  you	  know,	  this	  is	  a	  study	  of	  eyewitness	  memory.	  I	  regret	  having	  to	  deceive	  you	  about	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  study	  earlier,	  but	  as	  you	  can	  see	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  do	  this	  research	  without	  the	  use	  of	  some	  deception.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  you	  for	  participating	  in	  this	  research.	  	  I	  must	  ask	  you	  to	  please	  not	  talk	  to	  other	  people	  about	  the	  experiment.	  As	  you	  can	  see,	  it	  is	  critical	  that	  people	  not	  be	  informed	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  study	  prior	  to	  participating	  in	  it.	  Other	  people	  from	  the	  community	  have	  yet	  to	  participate,	  so	  please	  don’t	  tell	  them	  about	  the	  study.	  Okay?	  Thank	  you	  very	  much	  for	  you	  time,	  please	  have	  a	  lovely/great	  morning/afternoon.	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Context Questions 
1. Is there any person in the lineup who was seen in the film, but was NOT the person who 
stole the money from the wallet? 
Possible Answers:  1=No     2=Yes     3=Don’t Know 
 
2. If yes, what number does that person have in the lineup, and what was that person seen 
doing in the film?  Please describe below.  When you are done press the F7 key. 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 
 
3. Was the robber seen in any place in the film other than in the cafeteria where the money 
was stolen? 
Possible Answers:  1=No     2=Yes     3=Don’t Know 
 
4. If yes, where was the robber seen and what was he doing?  Please describe below.  When 
finished press the F7 key. 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 
 
5. When you were shown each photograph and asked whether or not that person was the 
thief how did you make your decision?  Please describe below.  Press the F7 key when 
finished. 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 
 
6. How many MALE preschool teachers, if any, were shown in the film?  Provide a VERY 
BREIF description of each, and state what they were doing.  Please describe below.  
After you are finished press the F7 key. 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 
 
7. Describe your memory of the robber.  What did he look like?  What type of clothing did 
he have on? (Give as much information as possible about the physical appearance of the 
robber.) Please describe below.  Press the F7 key when you are done. 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 
 
8. Describe your memory of the crime from the moment the victim entered the cafeteria 
until the end of the film.  (Describe everything you can remember about the event (even 
seemingly unimportant details)).  Please describe below.  Press the F7 key when you are 
done. 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 	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Demographic Questions 
 
1. How Old Are You?  Please type in your answer.  Press ENTER when done/ 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 
 
2. Are You: 
M = Male 
F=Female      
O=Other 
 
3. Which is your dominant hand? 
L=Left      
R=Right      
A= Ambidextrous 
 
4. What is your race/ethnicity? 
4=Caucasian / White 
5=Caucasian / White Non-Hispanic 
6=African American / Black 
7=Hispanic / Latino 
8=Asian-Pacific Islander 
9=Native American / American Indian 
 
5. Your Education Level is? 
1=Less than Highschool 
2=Highschool / GED 
3=Some College 
4=2-Year College Degree (Associates) 
5=4-Year College Degree (BS,BA) 
6=Master’s Degree 
7=Doctoral Degree 
 
6. Father’s Education Level 
1=Less than Highschool 
2=Highschool / GED 
3=Some College 
4=2-Year College Degree (Associates) 
5=4-Year College Degree (BS,BA) 
6=Master’s Degree 
7=Doctoral Degree 
 
7. Mother’s Education Level 
1=Less than Highschool 
2=Highschool / GED 
3=Some College 
4=2-Year College Degree (Associates) 
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5=4-Year College Degree (BS,BA) 
6=Master’s Degree 
7=Doctoral Degree 
 
8. What is your current occupation?  Please type in your answer.  (Press F7 when you 
are done) 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 
 
9. What was your first language?  Please type in your answer.  (Press Enter when you 
are done) 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 
 
10. Do you have corrected vision? 
1=Yes, Glasses 
2=Yes, Contacts 
3=Yes, Laser Surgery 
4=Yes, Other 
5=No 
 
11. Do you drink or eat caffeinated food and/or drinks? 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
 
12. Have you had caffeine in the last 24 hours? 
Y=Yes 
N=No 
 
13. Which of these best describes your average consumption of caffeine? 
1=Once a week 
2=Twice a week 
3=Three times a week 
4=Four times a week 
5=Five times a week 
6=Six times a week 
7= Everyday 
 
14. How many hours of sleep did you get last night?  Please type in your answer.  Press 
ENTER when you are done. 
Possible Answers:  (They type the response to this question) 	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MEMORANDUM 
  
 
 
TO:   Dominick Atkinson       IRB # 12-085 
  Dr. David Ross        
  
FROM: Lindsay Pardue, Director of Research Integrity 
 Dr. Bart Weathington, IRB Committee Chair 
 
DATE: February 21, 2013 
 
SUBJECT: IRB #:12-085: The Impact of Sequential Lineups on Unconscious 
Transference in Lineup Identification: Further Exploration 
 
 
The Institutional Review Board has reviewed and approved all changes proposed in Form B. 
 
 
 
You must include the following approval statement on research materials seen by participants and used 
in research reports: 
 
The Institutional Review Board of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (FWA00004149) has 
approved this research project # 12-085. 
 
Please remember that you must complete a Certification for Changes, Annual Review, or Project 
Termination/Completion Form when the project is completed or provide an annual report if the project 
takes over one year to complete.  The IRB Committee will make every effort to remind you prior to your 
anniversary date; however, it is your responsibility to ensure that this additional step is satisfied.   
 
Please remember to contact the IRB Committee immediately and submit a new project proposal for 
review if significant changes occur in your research design or in any instruments used in conducting the 
study. You should also contact the IRB Committee immediately if you encounter any adverse effects 
during your project that pose a risk to your subjects. 
 
For any additional information, please consult our web page http://www.utc.edu/irb or email 
instrb@utc.edu  
 
Best wishes for a successful research project. 	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   Dominick	  Joseph	  Atkinson	  was	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  Russiaville,	  IN.	  	  He	  attended	  Butler	  University	  in	  Indianapolis	  Indiana	  where	  he	  received	  a	  Bachelor	  of	  Arts	  in	  Psychology	  in	  May	  of	  2012.	  	  After	  graduation,	  he	  came	  to	  The	  University	  of	  Tennessee	  at	  Chattanooga	  to	  pursue	  his	  Master’s	  Degree	  in	  Research	  Psychology.	  	  While	  at	  UTC,	  he	  worked	  as	  a	  graduate	  student	  for	  the	  Teachers	  HELP	  Program	  and	  taught	  two	  introductory	  psychology	  courses.	  	  Mr.	  Atkinson	  has	  accepted	  an	  offer	  to	  continue	  his	  education	  and	  pursue	  his	  doctoral	  degree	  in	  cognitive	  psychology	  at	  Iowa	  State	  University	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2014.	  	  	  
